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Abstract
In an earlier paper [Blackorby and Murty; 2007] we showed that if a monopoly sector is
imbedded in a general equilibrium framework and profits are taxed at one hundred percent,
then unit (specific) taxation and ad valorem taxation are welfare-wise equivalent. In this
paper, we consider private ownership of the monopoly sector. Given technical difficulties
in making a direct general equilibrium comparison of unit and ad valorem taxation, we
adopt a technique due to Guesnerie [1980] and Quinzii [1992] in a somewhat different
context of increasing returns and non-convex economies to show that neither ad valorem
taxation nor unit taxation Pareto dominates the other; although, generally, the two are
not welfare-wise equivalent.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number:H21
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Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: The Private Ownership of Monopoly In General Equilibrium
by
Charles Blackorby and Sushama Murty
1. Introduction
It is well-known that, in a competitive environment, unit (or specific) taxation and ad
valorem taxation are equivalent. Cournot [1838, 1960] realized that the two tax systems
needed different treatment in the case of monopoly. Wicksell [1896, 1959] argued that
ad valorem taxes dominate unit taxation in a monopoly; a complete demonstration of his
claim was given by Suits and Musgrave [1955]. More specifically they demonstrated that,
if the consumer price and quantity of the monopoly good remained unchanged, the gov-
ernment tax yield is higher with ad valorem taxes than under a regime of unit taxes. This
follows because the profit-maximizing price of the monopolist is lower under ad valorem
taxation than under unit taxation. Most recent work in this area has investigated forms
of competition between pure monopoly and competition implicitly or explicitly accepting
the above dominance argument. Delipalla and Keen [1992] examine different models of
oligopoly with and without free entry to compare the two types of tax regimes while Lock-
wood [2004] shows, in a tax competition model, that tax competition is more intense with
ad valorem taxes thus yielding a lower price in equilibrium.
Wicksell and Suits and Musgrave derived the above mentioned monopoly result in a
partial equilibrium framework and claimed that ad valorem taxation was superior to unit
taxation on welfare grounds. Recently, stronger and more explicit claims have been made:
Skeath and Trandel [1994; p. 55] state that “in the monopoly case, given any unit excise
tax, it is possible to find an ad valorem tax that Pareto dominates it.”; Keen [1998; p. 9]
states that “The conclusion—due to Skeath and Trandel—is thus strikingly unambiguous:
with monopoly provision of a single good of fixed quality, consumers prefer ad valorem
taxation because it leads to a lower price, firms prefer it because it leads to higher profits
and government prefers it because it leads to higher revenue. There is no need to trade
off the interests of these three groups: ad valorem taxation dominates specific.”
It is this claimed welfare dominance of ad valorem taxes over unit taxation that
we challenge in this paper. In the context of a general equilibrium model with a single
monopoly sector, we show that the set of Pareto optima under unit taxation neither
dominates the set of Pareto optima with ad valorem taxation nor does the set of ad
valorem Pareto optima dominate the set of unit Pareto optima.
To be fair, none of the above authors claimed that they were talking about Pareto-
efficient taxes. Nevertheless, if the economy is at a Pareto-inefficient equilibrium there
will obviously be many tax regimes that dominate it. Focusing on Pareto-efficient taxes
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shows that at many Pareto optima, the optimal tax on the monopoly good is negative.1
Of course, in the case of a subsidy to the monopolist, the intuition that Wicksell and Suits
and Musgrave derived from the positive tax case is turned on its head: firstly, because
the government has to obtain money from somewhere else in the system to subsidize the
monopolist, and secondly, because, with a subsidy, the yield from an ad valorem tax is
lower than from the unit tax that leads to the same profit maximizing output for the
monopolist. Thus, in terms of the existing literature, unit subsidization dominates ad
valorem subsidization. To deal with these issues we adopt a general equilibrium approach
to the problem.
More specifically, we take a standard general equilibrium model in which a single
monopoly sector has been imbedded. In particular we adapt the model of Guesnerie and
Laffont [1978] (hereafter GL) to pose this question. We allow for private ownership of
the monopoly firm and the competitive firm in the model. In addition, the government
distributes its tax revenues by means of a demogrant which can be positive or negative.2
The problem raised by private ownership is that the monopolist’s profit under an ad
valorem tax is not equal to its profit from an equivalent unit-tax for the same monopoly
output level.3 However, the sum of government revenue and monopoly profits does not
change in the move to the equivalent unit-tax. This means that in the case of private
ownership, for fixed profit shares and when the number of consumers is more than one,
the incomes of the consumers change when moving from a unit-tax equilibrium to an
equivalent ad valorem-tax equilibrium; hence, in general, a given unit-tax equilibrium is
not an ad valorem-tax equilibrium of the same private ownership economy. Thus, there
is no direct way to compare the set of unit-tax equilibria with the set of ad valorem-tax
equilibria for a given private ownership economy. This remains true even in the special
case where all consumers have quasi-linear preferences.
To see this suppose that all consumers have quasi-linear preferences that are linear
in the monopoly good. Then, the demands for all competitive goods are independent
of income and the demand for the monopoly good depends only upon aggregate income
and not upon its distribution. Now, for a private ownership economy defined by a given
allocation of profit shares, consider moving from a unit-tax equilibrium to an equivalent
ad valorem one. Although the sum of government revenue and monopoly profits remains
constant in this move, each consumer’s income changes in two ways: first there is the
direct change via this consumer’s share in the monopoly profit and second there is the
change in that consumer’s demogrant. The latter implies if government revenue goes down,
1 In fact, when personalized lump-sum transfers are permitted, the optimal tax on the monopoly good
is always negative. See Guesnerie and Laffont [1978].
2 A demogrant is a uniform lump-sum tranfer. For notational simplicity we consider the case of zero
profit taxation; our result will hold however for any fixed level of profit taxation. In an earlier paper,
Blackorby and Murty [2007], we studied the limiting case of 100 per cent profit taxation, which becomes
a special case of the current model, when profit shares are equal across all consumers. In that paper we
showed that the sets of unit-tax and of ad valorem-tax Pareto optima were the same.
3 That is, the unit tax rate that can support the profit maximizing output of the monopolist under the
ad valorem tax.
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for example, then each consumer’s income will decline by 1/H (H being the number of
consumers) of this amount. In general these two change will not offset each other and
every consumer’s income changes when moving from the unit-tax equilibrium to the ad
valorem one. These income changes do not affect the demand for competitive (the non
monopoly) commodities and they do not change the aggregate demand for the monopoly
good. Thus equilibrium prices and aggregate equilibrium quantities are the same under
the two regimes. However, the consumption by each individual of the monopoly good is
different in the two regimes (because its demand depends upon each consumer’s income)
and the hence the utilities experienced by the consumer in the two regimes are different. It
is therefore impossible to make a direct comparison in the sense of Pareto of the unit-tax
and ad valorem-tax equilibria. For example, if the original unit-tax equilibrium was Pareto
optimal, there is no way of knowing directly if the resulting ad valorem-tax equilibrium is
also a Pareto optimum—we only know that it is usually different.
In order to be able to make a comparison of the two tax regimes we proceed in an
indirect manner which ultimately yields results. Consider the move from a unit-taxation to
ad valorem taxation as the reverse is more or less the same. At every unit-tax equilibrium
of a given private ownership economy, that is, for a given allocation of profit shares, there
exist equivalent ad valorem tax rates which lead to same production decisions. However, as
discussed above, under these ad valorem taxes, the given allocation of profit shares results
in different distributions of consumer incomes and hence different consumption decisions.
This lack of coordination between the production and consumption decisions (on account
of maintaining the rigid income distribution rule) as we move from unit to equivalent ad
valorem taxes motivates the use of a strategy followed by Guesnerie [1980] and explicated
in Quinzii [1992] in another context: proving the existence of an efficient marginal cost
pricing equilibrium in a non-convex economy with a given income distribution rule.
In our context, we proceed in the following manner. First, for each private ownership
economy, that is, for each possible allocation of shares to the consumers, we construct
the unit-tax utility possibility frontier—the set of all possible unit-tax Pareto optima
given those fixed shares in the profits. Next we construct the outer envelope of these
utility possibility frontiers. That is, for each feasible fixed level of utilities for persons
2 through H, we maximize, by choosing the allocation of private shares, the utility of
consumer one. Picking a particular fixed set of shares, say θ¯ = (θ¯1, . . . , θ¯H), we then search
along this unit-tax envelope to see if there is a point on it that is also supported as an
equilibrium of θ¯ private-ownership ad valorem economy. Under some regularity conditions
we show such a point (a vector of consumers’ utilities), say u¯ = (u¯1, . . . , u¯H), exists by a
fixed-point argument. Since u¯ lies on the unit envelope, there exists a share profile, say
ψ¯ = (ψ¯1, . . . , ψ¯H), such that the Pareto frontier of the corresponding unit-tax economy is
tangent to the unit envelope at u¯. We show that under our regularity conditions, at u¯,
the consumer incomes and equilibrium prices and quantities in the ad valorem and unit
economies are the same. However, we find that ψ¯ is not equal to θ¯ and that u¯ will never
belong to the utility possibility set of the θ¯ ownership unit economy unless the shares in
θ¯ were all equal to 1/H (and hence equivalent to one hundred per cent profit taxation
problem we have already solved) or the optimal tax on the monopolist happened to be
3
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equal to zero. In this way, we obtain a point on the Pareto frontier of a θ¯ private-ownership
economy with ad valorem taxes which is not present on the Pareto frontier of a θ¯ private-
ownership economy with unit taxes, demonstrating that unit taxation does not dominate
ad valorem when the monopoly is privately owned. The converse is proved in a similar
way.
We begin with a description of the economy and describe both unit-tax and ad
valorem-tax equilibria in these two economies. In Section 3, we construct the envelope
of the unit-tax utility possibility frontiers and describe how to find an ad valorem-tax
equilibrium along this unit-tax envelope. This leads to Theorem 1 which shows that when
a point on the unit-tax envelope has both a unit-tax and an ad valorem-tax equilibrium
representation, then the private ownership shares must be different in the two economies
(unless the original shares were equal to 1/H). In a similar manner, it is possible to show
(by searching for a unit-tax equilibrium along the ad valorem-tax envelope) that, for a
given allocation of shares, ad valorem taxation does not dominate unit taxation.4 Taken
together, these results substantiate the claim made above that neither tax system Pareto-
dominates the other. Section 4 answers an ancillary question. How do the two second-best
envelopes compare to each other and to the first-best utility-possibility frontier? We find
that the unit-tax equilibrium allocations on the unit envelope backed by profiles with pos-
itive shares for all consumers are, in fact, first-best. The ad valorem representations of
these allocations will also hence be first-best and will lie also on the ad valorem envelope
provided the supporting share profiles are non-negative.5 Section 5 concludes. All proofs
are contained in Appendix A. In Appendix B, we show that the assumptions made in
theorems in the main body of the paper can be justified from economic primitives.
2. Description of the Economy.
Consider an economy where H is the index set of consumers who are indexed by h.
The cardinality of H is H. There are N + 1 goods, of which the good indexed by 0 is the
monopoly good. The remaining goods are produced by competitive firms.
The aggregate technology of the competitive sector is Y c,6 the technology of the
monopolist is Y 0 = {(y0, ym)|y0 ≤ g(ym)}, and the technology of the public sector for
producing g units of a public good is Y g(g) = {yg ∈ RN+ | F (yg) ≥ g}. For all h ∈
H, the net consumption set is Xh ⊆ RN+1. The aggregate endowment is denoted by
(ω0, ω) ∈ RN+1++ . Suppose this is distributed among consumers as 〈ωh0 , ωh〉.7 For all
h ∈ H, a net consumption bundle is denoted by (xh0 , xh) (so that the gross consumption is
(xh0 + ω
h
0 , x
h + ωh)), and uh denotes the utility function defined over the net consumption
4 Since the exercise is repetitive, we do not prove the analogue of Theorem 1 for this case.
5 A similar argument can also be made for the relationship between the ad valorem-tax envelope and
the first-best frontier.
6 Aggregate profit maximization in this sector is consistent with individual profit maximization by
many different firms, as we assume away production externalities.
7 Any H dimensional vector of variables pertaining to all H consumers such as (u1, . . . , uH) is denoted
by 〈uh〉.
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set. The production bundle of the competitive sector is denoted by yc, of the public sector
by yg, and of the monopolist by (y0, y
m), where ym ∈ RN+ is its vector of input demands.
The economy is summarized by E = (〈ωh0 , ωh〉, 〈Xh, uh〉, Y 0, Y c, Y g). An allocation
in this economy is denoted by z =
(〈xh0 , xh〉, y0, ym, yc, yg). A private ownership economy
is one where the consumers own shares in the profits of both the competitive and monopoly
firms. A profile of consumer shares in aggregate profits is given by 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1.8 The
consumer price of the monopoly good is q0 ∈ R++, q ∈ RN++ is the vector of consumer
prices of the competitively supplied goods. The wealth of consumer h is given by wh. The
producer price of the monopoly good is p0 ∈ R++, p ∈ RN+ is the vector of producer prices
of the competitively supplied goods. The individual and aggregate consumer demands for
the monopoly good are given by
x0(q0, q, 〈wh〉) =
∑
h
xh0(q0, q, wh), (2.1)
and the individual and aggregate consumer demand vectors for the competitively supplied
commodities are given by
x(q0, q, 〈wh〉) =
∑
h
xh(q0, q, wh). (2.2)
The indirect utility function of consumer h is denoted by V h(q0, q, w
h).9 We assume
that the monopolist is naive, in the sense that it does not take into account the effect of
its decision on consumer incomes.10 Its cost and input demand functions are denoted by
C(y0, p) and y
m(y0, p), respectively. The aggregate competitive profit and supply functions
are denoted by Πc(p) and yc(p), respectively. We use the following general assumptions
on preferences and technologies in our analysis.
Assumption 1: For all h ∈ H, the gross consumption set is Xh + {(ωh0 , ω)} = RN+1+ ,
the utility function uh is increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and twice continuously differ-
entiable in the interior of its domain Xh. This, in turn, implies that the indirect utility
function V h is twice continuously differentiable.11 We also assume that the demand func-
tions (xh0(), x
h()) are twice continuously differentiable on the interior of their domain.
Assumption 2: The technologies Y 0, Y c, and Y g(g) are closed, convex, satisfy free
disposability, and contain the origin. The public good production function F is strictly
concave and twice continuously differentiable on the interior of its domain.
8 ∆H−1 is the H − 1-dimensional unit simplex. Assuming that consumers have the same shares of
monopoly and competitive sectors’ profits makes the following analysis simpler without any loss of gener-
ality.
9 There is also a public good g but, as it remains constant throughout the analysis, it is suppressed in
the utility function.
10 Likewise we assume that consumers are naive; they do not anticipate changes in theirs incomes due
to change in the profits of the monopolist.
11 See Blackorby and Diewert [1979].
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Assumption 3: The profit function of the competitive sector, Πc, is assumed to be
differentially strongly convex and the cost function C(y0, p) of the monopolist is assumed
to be differentially strongly concave in prices and increasing and convex in output.12 The
competitive supply yc(p) is given by Hotelling’s Lemma as∇pΠc(p) and the input demands
of the monopolist are given by ym(y0, p) = ∇pC(y0, p). The marginal cost ∇y0C(y0, p) is
positive on the interior of the domain of C.
2.1. A Unit-Tax Private-Ownership Equilibrium.
The monopolist’s optimization problem, when facing a unit tax t0 ∈ R and when the
vector of unit taxes on the competitive goods is t ∈ RN , is
P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) :=argmaxpu0
{
pu0 · x0 (pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉)− C (x0(pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉), p)
}
.
(2.3)
As discussed in detail in GL the profit function of the monopolist (the function over which
it optimizes) is not in general concave. Following them we assume that the solution to mo-
nopolist’s profit maximization problem is locally unique and smooth. Under assumptions
1, 2, and 3, the first-order condition for this problem is
∇q0x0 (pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) [pu0 −∇y0C(y0, p)] + x0(pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) = 0 (2.4)
which implicitly defines the solution pu0 = P
u
0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉).
Assumption 4: P u0 is single-valued and twice continuously differentiable function such
that
∇t0P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) 6= −1. (2.5)
As discussed in GL, ∇t0P u0 6= −1 implies that the monopolist cannot undo all changes
by the tax authority of t0. Since consumer demands are homogeneous of degree zero in
consumer prices and incomes, ∇q0x0 is homogeneous of degree minus one in these variables.
Also, the cost function C is homogeneous of degree one in p. Hence, it follows that the
left side of (2.4) is homogeneous of degree zero in pu0 , p, t0, t, and 〈wh〉. This implies that
the function P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) is homogeneous of degree one in p, t0, t, and 〈wh〉.
A unit-tax equilibrium in private-ownership economy with shares 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1 is
given by13
−x (q0, q, 〈wh〉) + yc(p)− ym(yu0 , p)− yg ≥ 0, (2.6)
−x0 (q0, q, 〈wh〉) + yu0 ≥ 0, (2.7)
pu0 − P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) = 0, (2.8)
wh = θh [p
u
0y
u
0 − C(yu0 , p) + Πc(p)] +
1
H
[
tT (yc − ym − yg) + t0yu0 − pyg
]
, ∀h ∈ H (2.9)
and
F (yg)− g ≥ 0, pu0 ≥ 0, p ≥ 0N , q0 = pu0 + t0 ≥ 0, q = p+ t ≥ 0N . (2.10)
12 See Avriel, Diewert, Schaible, and Zang [1988].
13 Lemmas B1 and B2 in the appendix demonstrate that the set of unit-tax equilibria is generically a
2N − 1-dimensional manifold.
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2.2. An Ad Valorem-Tax Private-Ownership Equilibrium.
The monopolist’s profit maximization problem, when confronted with ad valorem taxes
(τ0, τ) is
14
P a0 (p, τ0, τ, 〈Rh〉) :=
argmaxpa0
{
pa0x0
(
pa0(1 + τ0), p
T (IN + τ ), 〈Rh〉
)
− C
(
x0(p
a
0(1 + τ0), p
T (IN + τ ), 〈Rh〉), p
)}
,
(2.11)
Assumption 5: P a0 is single valued and twice continuously differentiable function such
that (1 + τ0)∇τ0P a0 6= −P a0 . This assumption reflects that the monopolist can not fully
undo the effect of the tax set by the government and is in fact implied by Assumption 4.
A monopoly ad-valorem tax equilibrium in a private ownership economy with shares
〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1 satisfies
−x (q, q0, 〈Rh〉) + yc(p)− ym(p, ya0)− yg ≥ 0, (2.12)
−x0 (q0, q, 〈Rh〉) + ya0 ≥ 0, (2.13)
pa0 = P
a
0 (p, τ0, τ, 〈Rh〉) , (2.14)
Rh = θh [p
a
0y
a
0 − C(ya0 , p) + Πc(p)] +
1
H
[
τ0p
a
0y
a
0 + p
Tτ [yc − yg − ym]− pT yg
]
∀h ∈ H,
(2.15)
F (yg)− g ≥ 0, (2.16)
and
pa0 ≥ 0, p ≥ 0N , q0 = pa0(1 + τ0) ≥ 0, q = (IN + τ )p ≥ 0N . (2.17)
As in the unit-tax case, it can be shown that the function P a0 is homogeneous of degree
one in its arguments.
3. Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes In Private Ownership Economies.
14 Symbols in bold face such as τ and p stand for diagonal matrices with diagonal elements being the
elements of vectors τ and p, respectively.
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3.1. An Ad Valorem-Tax Private-Ownership Equilibrium on the Envelope of Unit-Tax
Utility Possibility Frontiers
For each possible profile of profit shares, 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1, we obtain a unit-tax Pareto
frontier by solving the following problem for all utility profiles (u2, . . . , uH) for which
solution exists,
Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉) := max
pu0 ,p,t0,t,〈wh〉
V 1(pu0 + t0, p+ t, w1)
subject to
V h(pu0 + t0, p+ t, wh) ≥ uh, for h = 2, . . . , H,
− x (pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yc(p)− ym(yu0 , p)− yg ≥ 0,
− x0 (pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yu0 ≥ 0,
pu0 − P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) = 0,
wh = θh [p
u
0y
u
0 − C(yu0 , p) + Πc(p)] +
1
H
[
tT (yc − ym − yg) + t0y0 − pyg
]
∀h ∈ H,
and
F (yg)− g ≥ 0.
(3.1)
The envelope for the Pareto manifolds of all possible private ownership economies with
unit taxes is obtained by solving the following problem for all utility profiles (u2, . . . , uH)
for which solutions exist:
Uˆu(u2, . . . , uH) :=max〈θh〉
Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉)
subject to∑
h
θh = 1,
θh ∈ [0, 1], h ∈ H.
(3.2)
Suppose the solution to this problem is given by
〈∗θuh〉 = 〈
∗
θuh(u2, ..., uh)〉. (3.3)
That is, for given utility levels, (u2, . . . , uH), 〈∗θuh〉 is the vector of shares that maximizes
the utility of consumer 1.
We now generate an algorithm that picks out the ad valorem tax-equilibria that lie on
the envelope of all unit-tax utility possibility frontiers corresponding to different private
ownership economies.
Let Au be the set of all allocations corresponding to the utility profiles on the unit en-
velope Uˆu(u2, ..., uh). Define mappings 〈xh0(z), xh(z)〉, y0(z), ym(z), yc(z), and yg(z), which,
8
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for every z =
(〈xh0 , xh〉, y0, ym, yc, yg) ∈ Au, assign 〈xh0(z), xh(z)〉 = 〈xh0 , xh〉, yc(z) =
yc, yg(z) = yg, y0(z) = y0, and y
m(z) = ym.
Let ρu : Au → RH with image ρu(z) = 〈uh(xh0(z), xh(z))〉 be a utility map of the
allocations in Au. That is, for every z ∈ Au, the set of utility levels enjoyed by consumers
at that allocation is ρu(z). With some abuse of notation, let θuh(z) =
∗
θuh(ρ
u(z)) for all
h ∈ H be the solution of the problem (3.2) at the allocation z.
To apply the strategy outlined in the introduction, which is based on a fixed point
argument, we need to restrict all prices and taxes to a compact and convex set. A natural
way to do so is to adopt a price normalization rule, which the equilibrium system allows
as it is homogeneous of degree zero in the variables.15 Let b be such a normalization rule
such that the set
Sub := {(p0, t0, p, t) ∈ R+ ×R×RN+ ×RN | b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉) = 0 for any 〈wh〉 } (3.4)
is compact. Let (p¯u0 , t¯0, p¯, t¯〉 and (pu0 , t0, p, t) be the vectors of maximum and minimum
values attained by pu0 , t0, p, and t in Sub . For example, p¯u0 solves
max {pu0 ∈ R+| ∃t0, p, t, 〈wh〉 such that b(pu0 , p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) = 0}. (3.5)
Define the mapping ψu : Au → Sub as ψu(z) = (ψup (z), ψuw(z)), where ψup (z) =
(pu0(z), t0(z), p(z), t(z)) is the vector of unit taxes and producer prices associated with
allocation z (a unit tax equilibrium), while ψuw(z) = 〈wh(z)〉 is the profile of consumer
incomes associated with allocation z.
For every z ∈ Au, define q0(z) = pu0(z) + t0(z) and q(z) = p(z) + t(z). Since Sub is
compact, there exist (q¯0, q¯〉 and (q0, q) which denote the vector of maximum and minimum
possible consumer prices that can be attained under the adopted price normalization rule.
For all z ∈ Au we can separate q(z) and q0(z) into ad valorem taxes and producer
prices defined by functions (τ0(z), τ(z)) and (p
a
0(z), p(z)), which ensure that (y0(z), y(z))
and (pa0(z), p(z)) are the profit maximizing outputs and prices in the monopoly and the
competitive sector when the ad valorem taxes are (τ0(z), τ(z)), that is, (τ0(z), τ(z)) and
(pa0(z), p(z)) solve
q0(z) = p
a
0(z)(1 + τ0(z)) and
pa0(z) = P
a
0
(
τ0(z), p(z), t(z), 〈wh(z)〉
)
> 0
q(z) = (τ (z) + IN )p(z).
(3.6)
This implies, from arguments such as Suits and Musgrave, that for every z ∈ Au, if16
t0(z)
∇y0C(y0(z), p(z))
> −1 (3.7)
15 The rationale for this including a discussion of valid normalization rules and a proof that their choice
does not affect the solution (Lemma B3) is in the appendix.
16 See also Blackorby and Murty.
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then
τ0(z) =
t0(z)
∇y0C(y0(z), p(z))
, (3.8)
τ(z) = p(z)−1t(z), (3.9)
and using (3.8), we have17
pa0(z) =
q0(z)
1 + τ0(z)
=
q0(z) ∇y0C(y0(z), p(z))
∇y0C(y0(z), p(z)) + t0(z)
> 0. (3.10)
Given (i) an appropriate normalization rule and (ii) the fact that for a monopolist
pu0(z) ≥ ∇y0C(y0(z), p(z)), we have for every z ∈ Au
p(z) ∈ [p, p¯], pu0(z) ∈ [pu0 , p¯u0 ], t(z) ∈ [t, t¯], t0(z) ∈ [t0, t¯0], q0(z) ∈ [q0, q¯0], q(z) ∈ [q, q¯],
(3.11)
and18
∇y0C(y0(z), p(z)) ∈ [pu0 , p¯u0 , ]. (3.12)
Further, assuming that τ0(z) and p
a
0(z) are continuous functions, (3.8)–(3.12) imply
that there exist compact intervals [τ0, τ¯0] and [p
a
0
, p¯a0] such that for every z ∈ Au, we have
τ0(z) ∈ [τ0, τ¯0] , (3.13)
τ(z) ∈ [τ , τ¯ ] (3.14)
and
pa0(z) ∈
[
pa
0
, p¯a0
]
. (3.15)
In that case, if we define
Sub =
[
pa
0
, p¯a0
]
× [τ0, τ¯0]×
[
p, p¯
]× [τ , τ¯ ] , (3.16)
then for every z ∈ Au, we have (p0(z), τ0(z), p(z), τ(z)) ∈ Sub , which is a compact and
convex set.
For each allocation z ∈ Au we need to be able to identify the incomes of the consumers.
Define an income map for consumer h as the map ruh : Au × Sg × [0, 1] → R, which for
every z ∈ Au, pi = (pu0 , t0, p, t) ∈ Sub , and θh ∈ [0, 1] has image
ruh(z, pi, θh) = θh [p
u
0y0(z)− C(y0(z), p) + Πc(p)] +
1
H
[
t0y0(z) + t
T [yc(z)− ym(z)− yg(z))]− pT yg(z)
]
+ (pu0 + t0)ω
h
0 + (p
T + tT )ωh
(3.17)
17 If (3.7) is not satisfied then there is no ad valorem tax that that yields the same profit-maximizing
output as the given unit tax t0(z), for as seen below, violation of (3.7) would imply that pa0(z) is either
less than zero or does not exist.
18 Note normalization rules such as the unit hemisphere will ensure the restriction for ∇y0C(y0(z), p(z)),
below, as such a normalization implies ∇y0C ≥ 0 = pu0=0.
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and so∑
h
ruh
(
z, ψup (z), θ
u
h(z)
)
=
[
pu0(z)y0(z)− p(z)T ym(z) + pT (z)yc(z)
]∑
h
θuh(z)
+
[
t0(z)y0(z) + t
T (z)[yc(z)− ym(z)− yg(z))]− pT (z)yg(z)
]
+ q0(z)ω0 + q
T (z)ω
= q0(z)y0(z)− q(z)T ym(z) + q(z)T yc(z)− qT (z)yg(z) + q0(z)ω0 + qT (z)ω
(3.18)
The last equality in (3.18) is obtained by noting that q0(z) = p
u
0(z) + t0(z) and q(z) =
p(z) + t(z).
Define the mapping ψap(z) := (p
a
0(z), τ0(z), p(z), τ(z)). ψ
a
p identifies the ad valorem
taxes and prices associated with an allocation z ∈ Au that results in the same output
decisions as in the unit tax equilibrium. For all h ∈ H let rah : Au × Sub × [0, 1] → R be
defined so that
rah
(
z, ψap(z), θh
)
= θh
[
pa0(z)y0(z)− p(z)T ym(z) + pT (z)yc(z)
]
+
1
H
[
τ0(z)p
a
0(z)y0(z) + τ
T (z)p(z) [yc(z)− ym(z)− yg(z))]− pT (z)yg(z)
]
.
(3.19)
The maps 〈rah〉 generate the incomes of consumers at any allocation z ∈ Au using the
equivalent ad valorem price-tax configuration and arbitrary ownership shares 〈θh〉. Note
that since pa0(z)(1+τ0(z)) = p
u
0(z)+t0(z) = q0(z) and p
a(z)(1+τ(z)) = p(z)+t(z) = q(z),
we have from (3.18) and (3.19)∑
h
rah
(
z, ψap(z), θh
)
=
[
pa0(z)y0(z)− p(z)T ym(z) + pT (z)yc(z)
]∑
h
θh
+
[
τ0(z)p
a
0(z)y0(z) + τ
T (z)p(z) [yc(z)− ym(z)− yg(z))]− pT (z)yg(z)
]
+ q0(z)ω0 + q
T (z)ω
= q0(z)y0(z)− qT (z)ym(z) + qT (z)yc(z)− qT (z)yg(z) + q0(z)ω0 + qT (z)ω
=
∑
h
ruh
(
z, ψup (z), θh
)
=
∑
h
wh(z).
(3.20)
This demonstrates that the aggregate income at allocation z under unit-taxation and
income rule 〈θuh(z)〉 is the same as the aggregate income at z with equivalent ad valorem
taxes and any arbitrary income rule 〈θh〉.
Next, for every h ∈ H define
rhu =: min
z∈Au
ruh
(
z, ψup (z), θ
u
h(z)
)
(3.21)
and let zuh ∈ Au be the solution to (3.21). This is the allocation on Au which yields
the least income to h. The consumption bundle associated with it for consumer h is
(xh0(z
u
h), x
h(zuh)) =: (x
h
0 , x
h).
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Assumption 6: For h ∈ H, zuh is unique, uh(xh0(zuh), xh(zuh)) ≤ uh(xh0(z), xh(z)) for all
z ∈ Au, and rhu ≤ rah(z, ψup (z), θh) for all θh ∈ [0, 1].
This assumption implies, that, for every h, zuh is the allocation on A
u which is the
worst unit-tax equilibrium for h.
The following theorem proves the existence of an ad valorem equilibrium of a given
private ownership economy on the envelope of the Pareto frontiers of all private ownership
unit economies.19
Theorem 1: Let E = (〈(Xh, uh)〉, Y 0, Y c, Y g, 〈(ωh0 , ωh)〉) be an economy. Fix the profit
shares as 〈θh〉, renormalize utility functions 〈uh〉 such that uh(xh0(zuh), xh(zuh)) = 0 for all
h, and suppose the following are true20:
(i) assumptions 1 through 4 and 6 hold;
(ii) the mapping ρu : Au → ρu(Au) is bijective;
(iii) b is a normalization rule such that Sub is compact, and the mapping ψap : Au → Sub is
a continuous function;
(iv) Au is compact and ρu(Au) is a H − 1 dimensional manifold;
(v) for every z ∈ Au
t0(z)
∇y0C(y0(z), p(z))
> −1; (3.22)
(vi) the mapping
∗
θu : ρu(Au)→ ∆H−1 is a function.
Then
(a) there exists a ∗z ∈ Au such that ruh(∗z, ψup (∗z), θuh(∗z)) = rah(∗z, ψap(∗z), θh) for h ∈ H;
(b) ∗z is also an allocation underlying an ad valorem tax equilibrium of the private own-
ership economy with shares 〈θh〉;
(c) θuh(
∗z) = θh for all h ∈ H if and only if θh = 1H for all h ∈ H or t0(∗z) = 0;
(d) ρu(∗z) ∈ Uu(〈θh〉) := {〈uh〉 ∈ RH |u1 ≤ Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉)} if and only if θh = 1H
for all h ∈ H or t0(∗z) = 0.
Proof: See appendix A.
Conclusions (a) and (b) of the above theorem imply that given a ownership profile
〈θh〉 there exists an allocation ∗z such that ρu(∗z) lies on the unit envelope and ∗z is also
supported as an equilibrium of the ad valorem 〈θh〉 economy. (c) says that unless θh = 1H
for all h, the private ownership unit economy that is tangent to the unit envelope at
∗u = ρu(∗z), is not the same as the 〈θh〉 unit economy. (d) says that unless θh = 1H for
all h ∈ H, the utility imputation ∗u will never belong to the utility possibility frontier
corresponding to the 〈θh〉 unit economy. All these conclusions imply that (unless θh = 1H
19 The proof is motivated by the works of Guesnerie [1980] and Quinzii [1992] on non-convex economies.
The current strategy is similar to proving the existence of an efficient marginal cost pricing equilibrium
in a non-convex economy with a given income-distribution map.
20 The importance of Assumption 6 and Assumptions (ii) and (iv) for proving Theorem 1 is discussed
at the end of its proof.
12
Unit Versus Ad Valorem Taxes: Private Ownership and GE.Monopoly. May 1, 2007
for all h ∈ H) though ∗u belongs to the utility possibility set corresponding to the 〈θh〉 ad
valorem economy, it will not belong to the utility possibility set corresponding to the 〈θh〉
unit economy.
Note that Assumption 6 is sufficient to ensure against the situation where, given
a θh ∈ [0, 1], we have rhu > rah(z, ψup (z), θh) for all z ∈ Au. In such a case, no unit-
tax equilibrium in Au can be expressed as an ad valorem-tax equilibrium of a private
ownership economy where the share of h is θh. Lemmas B5 to B8 in the appendix show
that assumption (ii) and latter part of assumption (iv) will hold if the solution mappings to
the problems (3.2) and (3.1) are functions. The absence of these assumptions may create
discontinuities in the mapping ρu, which creates problem for applying the Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem.21 In addition, it may imply that, at the fixed point, say ∗u, corresponding
to 〈θh〉 share profile, the unit envelope is tangent to Pareto frontiers of two or more private
ownership economies, one of which, say 〈ψh〉 will result in ∗u being attainable in the 〈θh〉
ownership ad valorem economy. However, there may also be a tangency between the
envelope and the Pareto frontier of a 〈θh〉 ownership unit-economy at that point, in which
case we cannot conclusively prove that the utility possibility set of the ad valorem economy,
Ua(〈θh〉), is not a subset of Uu(〈θh〉).
3.2. A Unit-Tax Private-Ownership Equilibrium on the Envelope of Ad Valorem-Tax
Utility Possibility Frontiers.
Arguments for proving that, for any private ownership economy, the ad valorem utility
possibility set is not a subset of the unit utility possibility set, are similar to the ones
in the previous section. The Pareto manifold for a private ownership economy with ad
valorem taxes can be derived in a manner similar to (3.1). We will denoted its image by
u1 = Ua(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉) for shares 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1. An envelope for all Pareto manifolds
of private ownership economies with ad valorem taxes is obtained by solving the following
problem, where we choose the shares 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1 to solve
Uˆa(u2, . . . , uH) :=max〈θh〉
Ua(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉)
subject to∑
h
θh = 1
θh ∈ [0, 1],∀h.
(3.23)
We denote the solution to this problem by
〈∗θah〉 = 〈
∗
θah(u2, ..., uh)〉. (3.24)
Under assumptions analogous to the ones in the previous subsection, a theorem analogous
to Theorem 1 can be proved to show that, for every allocation of shares 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1,
there exists a unit-tax equilibrium of a 〈θh〉 ownership economy on the ad valorem-tax
envelope.
21 See Quinzii, p. 50.
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4. Unit-Tax Versus Ad Valorem-Tax Envelopes.
In the previous sections, we used the unit and the ad valorem envelopes to compare
the utility possibility sets of an arbitrarily given private ownership economy with unit
and ad valorem taxes. We established conditions under which neither Pareto dominates
the other. In this section, we compare the unit and ad valorem envelopes themselves. A
precurser to this study is an understanding of the relation between these envelopes and
the first-best Pareto frontier.
GL established that any first-best allocation can be decentralized as an equilibrium
of an economy with a monopoly, unit taxation, and personalized lump-sum transfers. The
optimum tax on the monopoly will be a subsidy, the tax on the competitive goods will be
zero (under suitable price normalization), and the personalized lump-sum transfer to any
consumer is the value of his consumption bundle at the existing shadow prices. Note, that
it is possible to find a profile of profit shares such that the personalized income to each
consumer at the given allocation can be expressed as a sum of his profit and endowment
incomes and a demogrant. This means that it is possible to decentralize a first-best as a
unit-tax equilibrium of some private ownership economy. Such profit share profiles will vary
from allocation to allocation on the first best frontier, and in general, there may exist share
profiles where some of the shares are negative.22 Intuitively, the first-best is an envelope
of Pareto frontiers of unit-tax economies corresponding to all possible private ownership
economies (including economies where some profit shares could well be negative).23 This
implies that if a first-best allocation can be decentralized as a unit-tax equilibrium of a
private ownership economy with a non-negative share profile, then it must also lie on the
unit envelope. In other words, points on the unit envelope where the inequality constraints
in problem (3.2) are non-binding are first-best. Theorem 2 below formalizes this intuition.
An exactly similar argument holds for ad valorem taxation and the relation between the
ad valorem envelope and the first-best Pareto frontier.
An understanding of the relation of the first-best frontier to the unit and ad valorem
envelopes is helpful for understanding where on the unit (ad valorem) envelope, does the
fixed point in Theorem 1 (or its analogue using the ad valorem envelope) occur for each
share profile 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1. Theorems 3 and 4 address this issue. Together, Theorems 2 to
4 allow us to make some conjectures on the position of the ad valorem envelope viz-a-viz
the unit envelope. In general, we find that there are regions of tangency between the two
(these occur at some first-best points or at points where the monopoly tax is zero), but
neither is a subset of the other. This establishes the fact that even in the bigger set of
22 This may be true, for example, when at some first-best allocation, the value of the consumption
bundle of some consumer at the existing shadow prices is smaller than the sum of the demogrant and his
endowment income.
23 It can be shown that the first-best Pareto frontier is a solution to the following problem:
max
〈θh〉
Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉) subject to
∑
h
θh = 1. (4.1)
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tax equilibria of all possible private ownership economies with non-negative profit shares,
neither unit taxation nor ad valorem taxation dominates the other.
4.1. Relation Between the First-Best Frontier and the Unit-Tax Envelope.
Using (3.1), the programme (3.2) can be rewritten as
Uˆu(u2, . . . , uH) := max
pu0 ,p,t0,t,〈wh〉,〈θh〉
V 1(pu0 + t0, p+ t, w1)
subject to
V h(pu0 + t0, p+ t, wh) ≥ uh, ∀h = 2, . . . , H,
− x(pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yc(p)− ym(p, yu0 )− yg ≥ 0
− x0(pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yu0 ≥ 0
pu0 − P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) = 0,
wh = θh[p
u
0y
u
0 − C(yu0 , p) + Πc(p)] +
1
H
[tT (yc − ym − yg) + t0y0 − pyg ], ∀h ∈ H,
F (yg)− g ≥ 0,∑
h
θh = 1, and
θh ∈ [0, 1],⇔ θh ≥ 0 and θh ≤ 1, ∀h ∈ H.
(4.2)
Theorem 2: Given Assumptions 1–4, if, for a utility profile on the unit-tax envelope,
〈uh〉, 〈
∗
θuh(u2, . . . , uH)〉 is such that
∗
θuh(u2, . . . , uH) > 0 for all h ∈ H, and the (N + 1) ×
(N + 1)-dimensional Slutsky matrix of aggregate consumer demands is of rank N , then,
〈uh〉 lies on the first-best frontier.24
Proof: See Appendix A.
A similar theorem can be proved for the ad valorem envelope.
4.2. The Difference in Unit and Ad Valorem Demogrants is the Difference in the Unit
and Ad Valorem Tax or Subsidy on the Monopolist.
Consider an allocation z that has both a unit equilibrium and an ad valorem equilib-
rium representation. Suppose the shares that make it a unit equilibrium are 〈θuh〉 ∈ ∆H−1,
and the shares that make it an ad valorem equilibrium are 〈θah〉 ∈ ∆H−1. Letting MuG(z)
and MaG(z) be total government revenue at z ∈ Au under the unit and ad valorem rep-
resentations of z respectively, 1HM
u
G(z) and
1
HM
a
G(z) are the demogrants under the two
24 Recall that solution for the optimal shares for programme (4.2) is denoted by 〈θh = ∗θuh(u2, . . . , uH)〉.
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regimes. We calculate the following difference, recalling the Suits and Musgrave relation
τ0(z) =
t0(z)
∇y0C(z) and (3.7)–(3.10).
MuG(z)−MaG(z) =[t0(z)− τ0(z)pa0(z)]y0(z)
=[t0(z)− t0(z)p
a
0(z)
∇y0C(z)
]y0(z)
=[
∇y0C(z)− pa0(z)
∇y0C(z)
]t0(z)y0(z).
(4.3)
Some remarks follow:
Remark 1: Since, under monopoly, ∇y0C(z) − pa0(z) < 0, from (4.3) it follows that
the unit demogrant is bigger than (smaller than, equal to) the ad valorem demogrant iff
t0(z) < 0 (t0(z) > 0, t0(z) = 0).
Remark 2 (From GL): If z is a first-best allocation and has both a unit and ad valorem
tax representation, then t0(z) < 0, and hence τ0(z) =
t0(z)
∇y0C(z) < 0.
25
4.3. The Nature of the Mapping of Ad Valorem Equilibria Onto the Unit Envelope.
Suppose assumptions of Theorem 1 hold for every 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1. Let us see where
on the unit envelope do the ad valorem equilibria corresponding to each such share profile
map into.
Theorem 3: Suppose 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1 and assumptions of Theorem 1 hold. Suppose z is
the allocation on the unit envelope, which is supported as the ad valorem tax equilibrium of
the 〈θh〉 ownership economy (that is z is the fixed point in Theorem 1). Then the following
are true.
(i) if θh > 0 for all h ∈ H, then the utility profile corresponding to z, ρu(z), either lies
on first-best frontier, or it lies below the ad valorem envelope.
(ii) if there exists h′ such that θh′ = 0 then t0(z) = 0 and θuh(z) = θh for all h ∈ H.
Proof: See Appendix A.
4.4. The Nature of the Mapping of Unit Equilibria Onto the Ad Valorem Envelope.
As stated in the introduction and the previous section, a result analogous to Theorem
1 can be proved to demonstrate that ad valorem taxation does not dominate unit taxation
for any given private ownership economy. To prove such a result would require making
regularity assumptions analogous to the ones made in Theorem 1 about the envelope of
the Pareto frontiers of all possible private-ownership economies with ad valorem taxes.
Suppose such assumptions hold. We now investigate the location of the unit-tax equilibria
on the ad valorem-tax envelope for a fixed share profile.
25 Note that every first-best allocation on the unit-envelope lies also on the ad valorem envelope, but the
reverse may not be true. Because of the subsidy to the monopolist and Remark 1 above, decentralizing
a first-best allocation on the ad valorem envelope as an equivalent unit-tax equilibrium of some private
ownership economy may involve negative shares.
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Theorem 4: Suppose 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1 and assumptions about the ad valorem envelope that
are analogous to those made in Theorem 1 for the unit envelope hold. Suppose z is the
allocation on the ad valorem envelope, which is supported as the unit tax equilibrium of the
〈θh〉 ownership economy. Then the following are true.
(i) if θh > 0 for all h ∈ H, then the utility profile corresponding to z, ρa(z), either lies
on first-best frontier, or it lies below the unit envelope.
(ii) if there exists h′ such that θh′ = 0 then either t0(z) = 0 and θah(z) = θh for all h ∈ H
or the utility profile ρa(z) lies on the first-best with θah(z) > 0 for all h ∈ H.
Proof: See Appendix A.
These theorems help us make some conjectures about the relative positions of the
unit and ad valorem envelopes. One such conjecture is shown in Figure 1. The points
where the two envelopes are tangent correspond either to some first-best situations (and
hence with negative monopoly taxes) or to second-best situations where the monopoly tax
is zero. There are situations where the unit envelope lies above the ad valorem envelope.
These are associated with positive monopoly taxes. Then there are also situations where
the reverse is true, and these are associated with negative monopoly taxes.
5. Concluding Remarks
In a general equilibrium model with a monopoly sector we have shown that the set of
Pareto optima in a unit-tax economy neither dominates the set of ad valorem-tax Pareto
optima nor is it dominated by it. If the shares in the private sector profits are equal for
all consumers (which is equivalent to one hundred per cent profit taxation) the two sets
of Pareto optima coincide. This conclusion is at odds with most of the existing literature
relating unit taxation to ad valorem taxation.
Earlier claims that equilibria in unit-tax economies are dominated by equilibria in ad
valorem-tax economies did not deal with the fact that the monopoly profits must be redis-
tributed to consumers either via government taxation and a uniform lump-sum transfer or
via the private ownership of firms. Nevertheless, the move from a unit-tax equilibrium to
an ad valorem one is not simply an accounting identity as it is in a competitive economy.
The technical problems encountered arise because it is not possible to make a direct
comparison of the unit-tax and ad valorem-tax equilibria for a given profile of profit shares
because the utilities of the consumers are different in the two regimes (unless the shares
are equal). To circumvent this problems we have resorted to an indirect and somewhat
novel procedure which draws heavily on earlier work by Guesnerie [1980] and Quinzi [1992]
in a somewhat different context of economies with increasing returns .
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6. Appendix A
This appendix contain the proofs of all of the theorems in the paper. The following ap-
pendix rationalizes some of the assumptions in Theorems 1 and 2 in terms of the underlying
primitives of the problem in so far as possible.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Our utility normalization and Assumptions (i), (ii), and (iv) of the theorem imply that
ρu(Au) is homeomorphic to ∆H−1, where the homeomorphism is κ : ρu(Au)→ ∆H−1 with
image
κ(u) =
u
||u|| , (6.1)
for every u = (u1, . . . , uH) ∈ ρu(Au).26 Note if u ∈ ρu(Au), then by our normalization
u ≥ 0H .27
Define the inverse of κ as K : ∆H−1 → ρu(Au).28
Define the correspondence T : Au × Sub → ∆H−1 as
T (z, pi) = {β ∈ ∆H−1|βh = 0 if there exists h such that
q0x
h
0(z) + q
Txh(z) + q0ω
h
0 + q
Tωh > rah(z, pi, θh)}.
(6.3)
We claim that T is non-empty, compact, convex valued, and upper-hemi continuous. It is
trivial to prove that T is nonempty and convex valued. We now show that it is upper-hemi
continuous, which will imply that it is compact valued, given Assumptions (iii) and (iv).
Suppose (zv, piv〉 → (z, pi〉 ∈ Au × Sub and βv → β such that βv ∈ T (zv, piv) for all v. We
need to show that β ∈ T (z, pi). If there exists h such that q0xh0(z) + qTxh(z) + q0ωh0 +
qTωh − ruh(z, pi, θh) > 0 then, by the definition of the mapping T , we have βh = 0. Since
the functions rah are continuous for all h in z and pi, there exists v′ such that for all v ≥ v′,
we have qv0x
h
0(z
v) + qvTxh(zv) + qv0ω
h
0 + q
vTωh− rah(zv, piv, θh) > 0. Hence βhv = 0 for all
v ≥ v′. Therefore βv → β implies that βh = 0.
The idea of correspondence T is to penalize (reduce utility of consumers) whenever
the allocation and producer prices and tax combination (z, pi〉 is such that the imputation
of consumption bundles at consumer prices exceeds the income made available through
profit shares and demogrant, evaluated at producer prices and taxes corresponding to pi.
26 See also Quinzii, p. 51.
27 For H > 1, we can show that u 6= 0H if u ∈ ρu(Au). For, suppose u = 0H . Then for any other
u′ ∈ ρu(Au) (such a u′ exists otherwise ρu(Au) would be a singleton and hence zero dimensional manifold,
contradicting assumption (iv)), there exists h such that u′h < uh (by definition of Pareto optimality),
and hence u′h < 0, which is a contradiction to our normalization of the utility functions (for under that
normalization, u ≥ 0 for all u ∈ ρu(Au)). Note also that, if κ(ρu(zuh)) = α, then αh = 0 and
∑
h′ 6=h αh′ = 1.
28 Its image is
K(α) = λ(α)α (6.2)
where λ(α) = max{λ ≥ 0|λα ∈ ρu(Au)}.
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Define the correspondence K : ∆H−1 × Sub → ∆H−1 × Sub , as
K(α, pi) = (T (ρu−1(K(α)), pi), Ψap(ρu−1(K(α)))). (6.4)
Under the maintained assumptions of this theorem, this correspondence is convex valued
and upper-hemi continuous. The Kakutani’s fixed point theorem implies that there is a
fixed point (∗α, ∗pi〉 such that ∗α ∈ T (ρu−1(K(∗α)), ∗pi) and ∗pi ∈ Ψap(ρu−1(K(∗α))).
Let ∗z := ρu−1(K(∗α)). Hence, ∗z ∈ A and is unique (as ρu and K are bijective). From
Assumption 6, we have
rhu ≤ rah(z, ψup (z), θh),∀h ∈ H, and ∀z ∈ Au. (6.5)
We now prove that
rah(∗z, ∗pi, θh) = q0(∗z)xh0(∗z) + qT (∗z)xh(∗z) + q0(∗z)ωh0 + qT (∗z)ωh, ∀h ∈ H. (6.6)
If there exists h such that
rah(∗z, ∗pi, θh) < q0(∗z)xh0(∗z) + qT (∗z)xh(∗z) + q0(∗z)ωh0 + qT (∗z)ωh, (6.7)
then by the definition of the correspondence T , we have ∗αh = 0. By the definition of the
homeomorphism K, this would imply ∗uh = 0, and by our utility normalization, we will
have (xh0(
∗z), xh(∗z)) = (xh0(zuh), xh(zuh)), so that the right-hand side of (6.7) is rhu. This
means that (6.7) contradicts (6.5). Hence, we have
rah(∗z, ∗pi, θh) ≥ q0(∗z)xh0(∗z) + qT (∗z)xh(∗z) + q0(∗z)ωh0 + qT (∗z)ωh, ∀h ∈ H, (6.8)
which implies
rah(∗z, ∗pi, θh)−
[
q0(
∗z)xh0(∗z) + qT (∗z)xh(∗z) + q0(∗z)ωh0 + qT (∗z)ωh
] ≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (6.9)
Now monotonicity of preferences (in Assumption (i)) implies that at the Pareto optimal
allocation ∗z , we will have∑
h
xh(∗z) + ω = yc(∗z)− ym(∗z)− yg(∗z) + ω and
∑
h
xh0(
∗z) + ω0 = y0(∗z) + ω0.
(6.10)
From second last equality in (3.20) and by multiplying the system in (6.10) by q(∗z)
and q0(
∗z) and adding, we have∑
h
rah(∗z, ∗pi, θh) =qT (∗z)[yc(∗z)− ym(∗z)− yg(∗z)] + q0(∗z)y0(∗z) + qT (∗z)ω + q0(∗z)ω0
=q0(
∗z)
∑
h
xh0(
∗zh) + qT (∗z)
∑
h
xh(∗z) + qT (∗z)ω + q0(∗z)ω0.
(6.11)
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This implies that∑
h
[
rah(∗z, ∗pi, θh)−
(
qT (∗z)xh(∗z) + q0(∗z)xh0(∗z) + qT (∗z)ωh + q0(∗z)ωh0
)]
= 0 (6.12)
Since (6.9) holds, (6.12) is true iff (6.9) holds as an equality, that is,
rah(∗z, ∗pi, θh) = qT (∗z)xh(∗z) + q0(∗z)xh0(∗z) + q0(∗z)ωh0 + qT (∗z)ωh = wh(∗z), ∀h ∈ H. (6.13)
From (6.13) we have for all h ∈ H
ruh(∗z, ψup (∗z), θuh(∗z)) = wh(∗z) = rah(∗z, ψap(∗z), θh) (6.14)
This proves (a).
The price and the ad valorem tax configuration ψap(
∗z) = (pa0(∗z), τ0(∗z), p(∗z), τ(∗z))
and the income configuration 〈rah(∗z, ψap(∗z), θh)〉 define an ad valorem tax equilibrium
of the private ownership economy 〈θh〉, the underlying equilibrium allocation is ∗z and
the consumer prices are (q0(
∗z), qT (∗z)) = (pa0(∗z)[1 + τ0(∗z)], pT (∗z)[IN + τ (∗z)]) = (pu0(∗z) +
tu0(
∗z), p(∗z) + t(∗z)). This proves (b).
Denote MuΠ(
∗z) = Πmu(∗z) + Πc(∗z), MaΠ(∗z) = Πma(∗z) + Πc(∗z), MuG(∗z) = t0(∗z)y0(∗z) +
tT (∗z)[yc(∗z)−ym(∗z)−yg(∗z)]−pT (∗z)yg(∗z), and MaG(∗z) = pa0(∗z)τ0(∗z)y0(∗z)+pT (∗z)τ (∗z)[yc(∗z)−
ym(∗z) − yg(∗z)] − pT (∗z)yg(∗z). At ∗z we know, from (3.20), that the sums of profits and
government revenue are the same under the unit and ad valorem systems, that is
MuΠ(
∗z) +MuG(∗z) =MaΠ(∗z) +MaG(∗z)
⇔− [MaΠ(∗z)−MuΠ(∗z)] =MaG(∗z)−MuG(∗z).
(6.15)
From conclusion (a) we have for all h ∈ H
wh(∗z) = θuh(∗z)MuΠ(∗z) +
1
H
MuG(
∗z) = θhMaΠ(∗z) +
1
H
MaG(
∗z)
⇒θuh(∗z)MuΠ(∗z)− θhMaΠ(∗z) =
1
H
[MaG(
∗z)−MuG(∗z)]
⇒θuh(∗z)MuΠ(∗z)− θhMaΠ(∗z) =
1
H
[MuΠ(
∗z)−MaΠ(∗z)].
(6.16)
The last equality follows from (6.15). Hence, (6.16) implies that θuh(
∗z) = θh for all h ∈ H
iff θh =
1
H for all h ∈ H or MuΠ(∗z)−MaΠ(∗z) = 0. The latter is true when t0(∗z) = 0. Thus,
(c) is true.
We now prove (d). Let ∗u := ρu(∗z).
If ∗u ∈ Uu(〈θh〉) := {〈uh〉 ∈ RH |u1 ≤ Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉)}, then since ∗u ∈ ρu(A), we
have, because of Assumption (vi), the unique solution to (3.2) as
∗
θu(∗u) = 〈θh〉. (6.17)
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From (c) this is true iff θh =
1
H for all h ∈ H or t0(∗z) = 0.
If θh =
1
H for all h ∈ H or t0(∗z) = 0, then again (6.17) follows from (c), and we have∗u ∈ Uu(〈θh〉) := {〈uh〉 ∈ H|u1 ≤ Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉)}.
Proof of Theorem 2: We write the Lagrangian of problem (4.2) as
L =−
∑
h
s¯h[uh − V h()]− v¯T [x()− yc() + ym() + yg]− v¯0[x0()− yu0 ]− β¯[pu0 − P u0 ()]
−
∑
h
α¯h
[
wh − θh[pu0yu0 − C() + Πc()]−
1
H
[tT (yc − ym − yg) + t0y0 − pyg ]
]
− r¯[g − F (yg)]− γ¯[
∑
h
θh − 1]−
∑
h
φ¯h[θh − 1],
(6.18)
where s¯1 = 1. Assuming interior solutions for variables p
u
0 , p, t0, t, and 〈wh〉, the first-order
conditions include
−
∑
h
s¯hx
h
0 − v¯T∇q0x− v¯0∇q0x0 +
∑
h
α¯hy
u
0θh − β¯ = 0, (6.19)
−
∑
h
s¯hx
h
0 − v¯T∇q0x− v¯0∇q0x0 +
∑
h
α¯hy
u
0
1
H
+ β¯∇t0P u0 = 0, (6.20)
−
∑
h
s¯hx
hT − v¯T∇qx+ v¯T [∇pyc −∇pym]− v¯0∇Tq x0
+
∑
h
α¯h
[
θh[−∇Tp C +∇TpΠc] +
1
H
[tT (∇pyc −∇pym)− ygT ]
]
+ β¯∇Tp P u0 = 0,
(6.21)
−
∑
h
s¯hx
hT − v¯T∇qx− v¯0∇Tq x0 +
∑
h
α¯h
1
H
[ycT − ymT − ygT ] + β¯∇Tt P u0 = 0, (6.22)
s¯h − v¯T∇whxh − v¯0∇whxh0 − α¯h + β¯∇whP u0 = 0, for h ∈ H, (6.23)
v¯T = r¯∇TygF −
∑
h
α¯h
1
H
[tT + pT ], (6.24)
and
v¯T∇yu0 ym = v¯0 +
∑
h
α¯h
[
θh[p
u
0 −∇yu0C] +
1
H
[−t T∇yu0 ym + t0 ]
]
. (6.25)
We also have the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions for 〈θh〉 and the Lagrange multipliers
〈φ¯h〉
α¯h[p
u
0y
u
0 − C() + Πc()]− γ¯ + φ¯h ≤ 0, θh ≥ 0 and
θh[α¯h[p
u
0y
u
0 − C() + Πc()]− γ¯ + φ¯h] = 0, ∀h ∈ H,
(6.26)
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and
θh − 1 ≤ 0, φ¯h ≥ 0, and φ¯h[θh − 1] = 0, ∀h ∈ H. (6.27)
The system can be simplified further. Subtract (6.20) from (6.19) to get
β¯[1 +∇t0P u0 ] = yu0
∑
h
α¯h[θh − 1
H
]. (6.28)
Subtract (6.22) from (6.21) to get
[v¯T+
∑
h
α¯h
H
tT ][∇pyc−∇pym]+[ycT−ymT ]
∑
h
α¯h[θh− 1
H
]+β¯[∇Tp P u0 −∇Tt P u0 ] = 0. (6.29)
Let 〈θh〉 = 〈
∗
θuh(u2, . . . , uH)〉. Then θh > 0 for all h ∈ H. Hence, from (6.27), we have
φh = 0 for all h, and (6.26) implies that
α¯h[p
u
0y
u
0 − C() + Πc()] = γ¯, ∀h ∈ H. (6.30)
which correspond to variables (θh)h. Now, (6.30) implies
α¯h =
γ¯
pu0y
u
0 − C() + Πc()
=: K, ∀h (6.31)
Given that
∑
h θh = 1, (6.31) implies that at any optimum,∑
h
α¯h[θh − 1
H
] = K
∑
h
[θh − 1
H
] = 0. (6.32)
Thus, (6.32) and (6.28), and the assumption that ∇t0P u0 6= −1 imply that
β¯ = 0, (6.33)
i.e., the monopoly constraint is non-binding at the solution to problem (4.2). From (6.29),
(6.32), and (6.33), we have
[v¯T +
∑
h
α¯h
H
tT ][∇pyc −∇pym] = 0. (6.34)
Homogeneity of degree zero in p of the competitive supplies and the monopolist’s cost
minimizing input demands implies
[v¯T +
∑
h
α¯h
H
tT ] = µpT , (6.35)
which from (6.24), implies
r¯∇TygF = (µ+K)pT . (6.36)
Now, (i) using (6.33) and (6.31), (ii) post multiplying (6.22) by xh0 , summing up over all
h, and subtracting from (6.20), (iii) post multiplying (6.22) by xhT , summing up over all
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h, and subtracting from (6.22), and (iv) recalling that at a tight equilibrium, we have∑
h x
h = yc − ym − yg and yu0 =
∑
h x
h
0 , we obtain[
v¯T v¯0
]∑
h
[∇q0xh +∇whxhxh0 ∇qxh +∇whxhxhT
∇q0xh0 +∇whxh0xh0 ∇qxh0 +∇whxh0xhT
]
=
[
0T 0
]
. (6.37)
But the second matrix on the left-handside of (6.37) is the sum over all h ∈ H of Slut-
sky matrices of price derivatives of compensated demands of the consumers. Since, by
assumption, each of these matrices has rank N , we have[
v¯T v¯0
]
= κ
[
qT q0
]
= κ
[
pT + tT pu0 + t0
]
. (6.38)
Employing (6.31), (6.35), and (6.38), we have
κ[pT + tT ] +KtT = µpT
⇒ κ[pT + tT ] +K[tT + pT ] = [µ+K]pT
⇒ κ+K
µ+K
qT = pT
(6.39)
From (6.31), (6.38), and (6.25), and exploiting the homogeneity properties of the cost
function, we have
µ∇yu0C = κq0 +K[q0 −∇yu0C]
⇒ κ+K
µ+K
q0 = ∇yu0C
(6.40)
By choosing r¯, κ, µ, and K such that κ+Kµ+K = 1 and r¯ = κ + K, we obtain from (6.36),
(6.39), and (6.40)
∇TygF = qT = pT and
∇yu0C = q0.
(6.41)
Thus (6.41) is reflective of joint consumption and production efficiency at the solution of
program (4.2). Hence, the allocation corresponding to a solution of program (4.2) is a first
best Pareto optimal allocation.
Proof of Theorem 3:
(ii) Suppose ∃h′ such that θh′ = 0. The unit shares that make z a unit tax equilibrium
(lying on the unit envelope) are given by
θuh(z) =
θhM
a
Π(z) +
1
H [M
a
G(z)−MuG(z)]
MuΠ(z)
≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (6.42)
So for h′, we have
θuh′(z) =
1
H [M
a
G(z)−MuG(z)]
MuΠ(z)
≥ 0. (6.43)
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From (4.3) this implies that t0(z) ≥ 0. We prove that t0(z) = 0. Suppose not. Then
t0(z) > 0. This means, from (4.3), that
θuh(z) =
θhM
a
Π(z) +
1
H [M
a
G(z)−MuG(z)]
MuΠ(z)
> 0,∀h ∈ H. (6.44)
Thus z is on the unit envelope with θuh(z) > 0 for all h ∈ H. This implies from Theorem
2 that z is first-best. But this contradicts Remark 2 based on GL, which says t0(z) < 0
for a first-best allocation with a unit-tax representation. Hence t0(z) = 0. This means
MaΠ(z) =M
u
Π(z). Combined with (4.3) and (6.42) we get θh = θ
u
h(z) for all h ∈ H.
(i) Suppose θh > 0 for all h ∈ H. Two case are possible from viewing (6.42).
(a) θuh(z) > 0 for all h ∈ H. Thus z is on the unit envelope with θuh(z) > 0 for all h ∈ H.
This implies from Theorem 2 that z is first-best. Remark 2 based on GL, implies
t0(z) < 0.
(b) There exists h′ such that θuh′(z) = 0. (6.42) implies that
0 = θh′M
a
Π(z) +
1
H
[MaG(z)−MuG(z)]. (6.45)
Since θh > 0 for all h ∈ H, including h′ by assumption and profits are not zero, this
implies
θh′M
a
Π(z) =
1
H
[MuG(z)−MaG(z)] > 0. (6.46)
From (4.3), this means t0(z) < 0. So either z is a first-best (with constraints in
Theorem 2 just binding) or is an ad valorem equilibrium with positive shares on the
unit envelope. The analogue of Theorem 1 for the ad valorem-tax envelope implies
that z does not lie on the ad valorem envelope (as any ad valorem equilibrium on the
ad valorem envelope with positive shares is a first-best by the analogue of Theorem
2, which gives the relation between the first-best frontier and the ad valorem-tax
envelope). Hence the ad valorem envelope lies above the unit envelope for the utility
profile ρu(z).
Proof of Theorem 4:
(i) Suppose θh > 0 for all h ∈ H. The ad valorem shares that make z an ad valorem tax
equilibrium (lying on the ad valorem envelope) are given by
θah(z) =
θhM
u
Π(z) +
1
H [M
u
G(z)−MaG(z)]
MaΠ(z)
≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (6.47)
Two cases are possible from (6.47):
(a) θah(z) > 0 for all h ∈ H. Since we are on an ad valorem envelope, the analogue of
Theorem 2 for ad valorem-tax envelope implies that z is a first-best.
(b) There exists h′ such that θah′(z) = 0. (6.47) implies that
θah′(z) = 0 = θh′M
u
Π(z) +
1
H
[MuG(z)−MaG(z)]. (6.48)
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Which implies, because θh > 0 for all h ∈ H in case (i) of this theorem, that
θh′M
u
Π(z) =
1
H
[MaG(z)−MuG(z)] > 0. (6.49)
From (4.3), this means that τ0(z) > 0 or t0(z) > 0. So from Remark 2, we cannot
be on a first-best, at this point on the ad valorem envelope. Since this is a unit-tax
equilibrium with positive shares, which is not on the first-best, from Theorem 2, we
cannot be on the unit envelope. Hence the unit envelope lies above the ad valorem
envelope at this utility profile ρa(z).
(ii) Suppose ∃h′ such that θh′ = 0. Then from (6.47)
θah′(z) =
1
H [M
u
G(z)−MaG(z)]
MaΠ(z)
≥ 0, ∀h ∈ H. (6.50)
From (4.3), this means that τ0(z) ≤ 0 or t0(z) ≤ 0. Two case are possible:
(a) τ0(z) < 0. From (4.3), this would mean M
u
G(z)−MaG(z) > 0, and hence from (6.50),
this would mean θah(z) > 0 for all h ∈ H. Since we are on the ad valorem envelope,
from the analogue of Theorem 2 for the ad valorem envelope, this would mean that
z is first-best.
(b) τ0(z) = 0. This means M
a
Π(z) = M
u
Π(z). Combined with (4.3) and (6.50) we get
θh = θ
a
h(z) for all h ∈ H.
7. Appendix B
The discussion and proofs in this appendix are for economies with unit taxes. Similar
discussions and results can be obtained for the ad valorem tax case.
A tight unit-tax equilibrium is obtained by replacing the inequalities in (2.6) to (2.10)
by equalities. We focus only on tight unit-tax equilibria. The domain of the vector
of variables (pu0 , p, t0, t, 〈wh〉, y0, yg) is taken to be RN+1++ × RN+1 × RH+N+1+ , which we
denote by ΩE .
Note that the equilibrium system (2.6) to (2.10) is homogeneous of degree zero in
the variables pu0 , p, t0, t, and 〈wh〉.29 So we can adopt a normalization rule to uniquely
determine prices, taxes, and incomes corresponding to equilibrium allocations.
A function b : R+ ×R×RN+ ×RN ×RH+ → R defines a price-normalization rule
b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉) = 0 (7.1)
if it is continuous and increasing and there exists a function Bb : R+ ×R×RN+ ×RN →
R++, with image Bb(pip0 , pit0 , pip, pit), such that for every (pip0 , pit0 , pip, pit, 〈piwh〉〉 ∈ R+ ×
R×RN+ ×RN ×RH+ ,
b(
pip0
Bb()
,
pit0
Bb()
,
pip
Bb()
,
pit
Bb()
, 〈 piwh
Bb()
〉) = 0 (7.2)
29 Recall, that the function Pu0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) is homogeneous of degree one in p, t0, t, and 〈wh〉.
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Monotonicity of the function b implies that the function Bb is unique for a given
function b.30 Let us choose an increasing and differentiable function b : ΩN → R, which
defines a valid price normalization rule in the sense of that defined in the earlier section31
b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉) = 0. (7.3)
Under such a normalization rule and some regularity assumptions, the set of all (tight)
unit tax equilibria can be shown to be generically a 2N − 1 dimensional manifold. Lemma
A1 below demonstrates this. Define the function: F : ΩE → RN+H+4 with image
F(p0, p, t, t0, 〈wh〉, y0, yg) as
− x(p0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yc(p)− ym(yu0 , p)− yg
− x0(p0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yu0
pu0 − P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉)
wh −
[
θh[p
u
0y
u
0 − C(yu0 , p) + Πc(p)] +
1
H
[tT (yc(p)− ym(yu0 , p)− yg) + t0yu0 − pyg]
]
, ∀h
F (yg)− g
b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉).
(7.4)
Lemma A1: Suppose F is a differentiable mapping and there exists a neighborhood
E around 0 in RN+H+4 such that for all ν ∈ E, F−1(ν) 6= ∅. Then for almost all
ν ∈ E (that is, except for a set of measure zero in E), F−1(ν) is a manifold of dimension
2N − 1 = 3(N + 1) +H − [N +H + 4].
The proof follows from Sard’s theorem.32 This lemma implies that the set of regular
economies which differ from the original one only in terms of endowments is very large
(this set is dense).
Suppose F is differentiable. Denote the derivative of F , evaluated at v ∈ ΩE as the
linear mapping ∂Fv : ΩE → RN+H+4 where ∂Fv is the Jacobian matrix, evaluated at v
∂Fv =

JE1
JE2
JE3
JE4
JE5
 , (7.5)
30 Some examples:
(i) b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉) =‖ 〈p0, t0, p, t〉 ‖ −1 and Bb(p0, t0, p, t) =‖ 〈p0, t0, p, t〉 ‖
(ii) b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉) = p1 − 1 and Bb(p0, t0, p, t) = p1
(iii) b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉) = p0 +
∑N
k=1 pk − 1 and Bb(p0, t0, p, t) = p0 +
∑N
k=1 pk.
31 ΩN := RN+1++ ×RN+1 ×RH+ .
32 For a discussion of the method of proof, see Guesnerie [1995; pp. 106-107].
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with
JE1 = [J
1
E1 J
2
E1]
J1E1 =
[ −∇q0x −∇q0x −∇qx −∇qx−∇Tp ym +∇pyc −∇w1x1 . . . −∇wHxH
−∇q0x0 −∇q0x0 −∇qx0 −∇qx −∇w1x10 . . . −∇wHxH0
]
J2E1 =
[−∇y0ym −I
1 0TN
]
.
(7.6)
JE2 = [J
1
E2 J
2
E2]
J1E2 =−
1
H y0 −θ1yu0 − 1H [ycT − ymT − yg] −θ1[ycT − ymT ] + 1H ygT 1 0 . . . 0
...
− 1H y0 −θHyu0 − 1H [ycT − ymT − yg] −θH [ycT − ymT ] + 1H ygT 0 0 . . . 1

J2E2 =
 θ1∇y0C −
1
H t0
1
HP
T
...
θH∇y0C − 1H t0 1HP T
 .
(7.7)
JE3 =
[−∇t0P u0 1 −∇Tt P u0 −∇Tp P u0 −∇h1P u0 . . . −∇wHP u0 0 0TN ] , (7.8)
JE4 =
[
0 0 0TN 0
T
N 0 . . . 0 0 ∇TygF
]
, (7.9)
and
JE5 =
[∇t0b ∇p0b ∇Tt b ∇Tp b ∇w1b . . . ∇wH b 0 0TN ] . (7.10)
By stacking the matrices above and looking at the structure of ∂Fv, it can be seen that
∂Fv, which is of dimension (N +H + 4)× 3(N + 1) +H, has at least rank N +H + 2 for
all v ∈ ΩE . There are at least N +H + 2 columns in ∂Fv which are linearly independent
for all v ∈ ΩE . These are columns that correspond to the variables yg, y0, 〈wh〉, and p0.
Lemma A2: Suppose F is a differentiable mapping, F−1(0) 6= ∅, and 0 is a regular
value of F (that is, the rank of ∂Fv is N +H + 4 for all v ∈ F−1(0)). Then F−1(0) (the
set of all tight tax equilibria) is a manifold of dimension 2N − 1.
The proof follows from the pre-image theorem.
Assumption A1: The set of tight tax equilibria F−1(0) is a subset of the interior of ΩE
and is a manifold of dimension 2N − 1.
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Consider problem that identifies the Pareto manifold for a 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1 economy.
Using (3.1) and our normalization rule, the programme can be rewritten as
Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉) := max
pu0 ,p,t0,t,〈wh〉,y0,yg
V 1(pu0 + t0, p+ t, w1)
subject to
V h(pu0 + t0, p+ t, wh) ≥ uh, ∀h = 2, . . . , H,
− x(pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yc(p)− ym(p, yu0 )− yg ≥ 0
− x0(pu0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yu0 ≥ 0
pu0 − P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉) = 0,
wh = θh[p
u
0y
u
0 − C(yu0 , p) + Πc(p)] +
1
H
[tT (yc − ym − yg) + t0y0 − pyg ], ∀h,
F (yg)− g ≥ 0,
b(pu0 , t0, p, t, 〈wh〉) = 0.
(7.11)
We write the Lagrangian as
L =−
∑
h
s¯h[uh − V h()]− v¯T [x()− yc() + ym() + yg]− v¯0[x0()− yu0 ]− β¯[pu0 − P u0 ()]
−
∑
h
α¯h
[
wh − θh[pu0yu0 − C() + Πc()]−
1
H
[tT (yc − ym − yg) + t0y0 − pyg ]
]
− r¯[g − F (yg)]− δ¯ b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉),
(7.12)
with s¯1 = 1, s¯h ≥ 0 for all h = 2, . . . , H, v¯ ≥ 0N , v¯0 ≥ 0, r¯ ≥ 0, and the signs of the other
Lagrange multipliers (those corresponding to equality constraints) being unrestricted.33
Suppose Assumption A1 holds and all solutions to (7.11) involve tight tax equilibria.
The first order necessary conditions of this problem, for any utility profile (u2, . . . , uH) for
which solution exists, include
(a) those (3(N + 1) + H of them) obtained by taking the derivatives of the Lagrangian
with respect to the choice variables,
−
∑
h
s¯hx
h
0 − v¯T∇q0x− v¯0∇q0x0 +
∑
h
α¯hy
u
0θh − β¯ − δ¯∇p0b = 0, (7.13)
−
∑
h
s¯hx
h
0 − v¯T∇q0x− v¯0∇q0x0 +
∑
h
α¯hy
u
0
1
H
+ β¯∇t0P u0 − δ¯∇t0b = 0, (7.14)
33 Note, in general, the signs of the Lagrange multipliers are specific to the way in which one sets up
the optimization. If we were optimizing consumer h’s utility keeping utility of consumers 1, . . . , h− 1, h+
1, . . . ,H fixed then the sign restrictions on the vector s¯ would be different (s¯h = 1 and s¯h′ ≥ 0, ∀h′ 6= h.
As an example, in the context of tax reforms as in Guesnerie [1998], the sign restrictions we need to impose
when the optimum corresponds to one where there exist no directions of change that improve welfare of
each consumer are 0H 6= s¯ ≥ 0H .
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−
∑
h
s¯hx
hT − v¯T∇qx+ v¯T [∇pyc −∇pym]− v¯0∇Tq x0 +
∑
h
α¯h
[
θh[−∇Tp C +∇TpΠc]
+
1
H
[tT (∇pyc −∇pym)− ygT ]
]
+ β¯∇Tp P u0 − δ¯∇Tp b = 0,
(7.15)
−
∑
h
s¯hx
hT − v¯T∇qx− v¯0∇Tq x0+
∑
h
α¯h
1
H
[ycT −ymT −ygT ]+ β¯∇Tt P u0 − δ¯∇Tt b = 0, (7.16)
s¯h − v¯T∇whxh − v¯0∇whxh0 − α¯h + β¯∇whP u0 − δ¯∇whb = 0, for h = 1, . . . , H, (7.17)
v¯T = r¯∇TygF −
∑
h
α¯h
1
H
[tT + pT ], (7.18)
and
v¯T∇yu0 ym = v¯0 +
∑
h
α¯h
[
θh[p
u
0 −∇yu0C] +
1
H
[−t T∇yu0 ym + t0 ]
]
. (7.19)
(b) the equilibrium conditions (2.6) to (2.10) (N +H + 3 of them) written as equalities,
(c)
V h(pu0 + t0, p+ t, wh) = uh, ∀h = 2, . . . , H, (7.20)
and
(d) the normalization rule
b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉) = 0. (7.21)
We can prove that the normalization constraint is non-binding at the optimum, that
is, δ¯ = 0.
Lemma A3: At any solution of problem (7.11), δ¯ = 0.
Proof: Multiplying (7.13) to (7.17) by pu0 , t0, p, t, and 〈wh〉, respectively, adding, and
making use of (i) the homogeneity properties of consumer demands, the competitive output
supplies, and the input demands of the monopolist, (ii) the fact that the consumers budget
constraints hold at the optimum, (iii) the tight equilibrium conditions x = yc − ym − yg
and x0 = y0, and (iv) the Shephard’s and the Hotelling’s lemma, we obtain
δ¯[∇p0b pu0 +∇t0b t0 +∇Tp b p+∇Tt b t+
∑
h
∇whb wh] = 0. (7.22)
Clearly b being an increasing function (as required when it is a valid normalization rule)
cannot be homogeneous of degree zero. This means (7.22) implies that δ¯ = 0.
This demonstrates the invariance of the Pareto optimal allocations to the normaliza-
tion rule that is adopted.
Further, at the optimum, the Lagrange multipliers on the inequality constraints– 〈s¯h〉,
(v¯0, v¯), and r¯– are all non-negative with s¯1 = 1, the multipliers on the equality constraints–
α¯, δ¯, and β¯– are unrestricted in sign (δ¯ of course takes a zero value at the optimum).
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Note that there may exist parameter values (u2, . . . , uH) for which the constraint set
of problem (3.1) is empty, and hence no solution exists to this problem. We would like
to know the set of parameter values for which the solution exists and, once we know this,
we would like to know whether the Pareto frontier (the utility possibility frontier) for this
private ownership economy is a manifold and, if so, of what dimension. Can the dimension
of this manifold be H − 1?
Denote {1}×RH−1+ ×RN+1+ ×RH+3 =: ΩL. This is the space in which the Lagrange
multipliers s1 = 1, s2, . . . , sH , v0, v, 〈αh〉, r, β, and δ lie. Thus, ΩL is a N + 2H + 3-
dimensional manifold in a N + 2H + 4-dimensional Euclidean space. Suppose c :=
(p0, p, t0, t, 〈wh〉, y0, yg, 〈sh〉, v0, v, 〈αh〉, β, r, δ) ∈ ΩE × ΩL are a configuration of choice
variables and the Lagrange multipliers that solve equations (7.13) to (7.19), (2.6) to (2.10)
and (7.21). (Note, we are excluding here equations (7.20)). Then it would mean that c
offer a solution to problem (3.1) for parameter values uh = V
h(pu0 + t0, p + t, wh) for all
h = 2, . . . , H. Hence problem (3.1) is well defined for parameter values (u2, . . . , uH). We
use this method to try to find the set of all parameter values for which the solution to (7.6)
exists. Thus, we first find the set of all configurations c ∈ ΩE × ΩL that solve equations
(7.13) to (7.19), (2.6) to (2.10), and (7.21). Recall, ΩE lies in a 3(N +1)+H-dimensional
space, while ΩL is aN+2H+3-dimensional manifold in aN+2H+4-dimensional Euclidean
space. Thus, ΩE×ΩL is a 4N+3H+6-dimensional manifold in a 4N+3H+7-dimensional
Euclidean space.
Define the mapping: Pu : ΩE × ΩL → R4N+2H+7 as one with image
Pu(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉, y0, yg, 〈sh〉, 〈αh〉, v, v0, β, δ) (7.23)
given by the vector of the following 4N + 2H + 7 functions,
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−
∑
h
s¯hx
h
0 − v¯T∇q0x− v¯0∇q0x0 +
∑
h
α¯hy
u
0θh − β¯ − δ¯∇p0b,
−
∑
h
s¯hx
h
0 − v¯T∇q0x− v¯0∇q0x0 +
∑
h
α¯hy
u
0
1
H
+ β¯∇t0P u0 − δ¯∇t0b,
−
∑
h
s¯hx
hT − v¯T∇qx+ v¯T [∇pyc −∇pym]− v¯0∇Tq x0
+
∑
h
α¯h
[
θh[−∇Tp C +∇TpΠc] +
1
H
[tT (∇pyc −∇pym)− ygT ]
]
+ β¯∇Tp P u0 − δ¯∇Tp b,
−
∑
h
s¯hx
hT − v¯T∇qx− v¯0∇Tq x0 +
∑
h
α¯h
1
H
[ycT − ymT − ygT ] + β¯∇Tt P u0 − δ¯∇Tt b,
s¯h − v¯T∇whxh − v¯0∇whxh0 − α¯h + β¯∇whP u0 − δ¯∇whb for h = 1, . . . , H,
v¯T − [r¯∇TygF −
∑
h
α¯h
1
H
[tT + pT ]],
v¯T∇yu0 ym − [v¯0 +
∑
h
α¯h
[
θh[p
u
0 −∇yu0C] +
1
H
[−t T∇yu0 ym + t0 ]
]
],
− x(p0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yc(p)− ym(yu0 , p)− yg,
− x0(p0 + t0, p+ t, 〈wh〉) + yu0 ,
− pu0 + P u0 (p, t0, t, 〈wh〉),
wh − [θh[pu0yu0 − C(yu0 , p) + Πc(p)] +
1
H
[tT (yc(p)− ym(yu0 , p)− yg) + t0yu0 − pyg]], ∀h,
F (yg)− g, and
b(p0, t0, p, t, 〈wh〉).
(7.24)
Suppose Pu−1(0) 6= ∅. This, would then be the set of all configurations (t0, p0, t, p,
〈wh〉, y0, yg) and (〈sh〉, 〈αh〉, v, v0, β, δ) that solve equations (7.13) to (7.19) and (2.6) to
(2.10), and (7.21). Hence if v := (p0, p, t0, t, 〈wh〉, y0, yg, 〈sh〉, v0, v, 〈αh〉, β, r, δ) ∈ Pu−1(0)
then it offers a solution to the problem (3.1) for parameter values uh = V
h(pu0+t0, p+t, wh)
for all h = 2, . . . , H. Thus V 1(pu0 + t0, p+ t, w1) = Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈θh〉).
Lemma A4: Suppose Assumptions 1 to 6 hold, and A1 hold and Pu−1(0) 6= ∅. Define
the following projection mapping
Proj : Pu−1(0)→ F−1(0). (7.25)
If zero is a regular value of Pu then the dimension of the manifold Proj(Pu−1(0)) ≤
min{2N − 1, H − 1}.34
34 As in Guesnerie [1995], this is a generic phenomenon.
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Proof: Note that Pu−1(0) ⊂ F−1(0)×ΩL (as the system Pu = 0 contains the equilibrium
equations). Hence, dimension of Proj(Pu−1(0)) ≤ dimension of Proj(F−1(0) × ΩL) =
2N−1. If zero is regular value of the mapping Pu then, from the pre-image theorem, it fol-
lows that Pu−1(0) is a H−1-dimensional manifold. Hence dimension of Proj(Pu−1(0)) ≤
H − 1. Therefore, If zero is a regular value of Pu then the dimension of the manifold
Proj(Pu−1(0)) ≤ min{2N − 1, H − 1}.
Define the mapping V : ΩˆE → RH , where ΩˆE ⊂ ΩE is the set of all (pu0 , p, t0, t, 〈wh〉,
y0, y
g) ∈ ΩE such that p0 + t0 > 0 and p+ t 0 as
V := (V 1(p0 + t0, p+ t, w1), . . . , V
H(p0 + t0, p+ t, wH)). (7.26)
Applying the Roy’s theorem, the Jacobian matrix ∇V is given by
∇V :=
 −λ
1x10 −λ1x1 −λ1x10 −λ1x1 λ1 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
−λHxH0 −λHxH −λHxH0 −λHxH 0 0 . . . λH 0 . . . 0
 .
(7.27)
It is clear that if preferences of all consumers were monotonic, then∇V has rank H. Define
the mapping Vu : ΩˆE × ΩL → RH to be an obvious extension of the mapping V to the
bigger space ΩˆE × ΩL.35
Lemma A5: Suppose Assumptions 1 to 6 and A1 hold, zero is a regular value of Pu,
and Pu−1(0) 6= ∅. Then
(a) the image of the restricted mapping Vu : Pu−1(0)→ RH (the utility possibility frontier
of economy 〈θh〉) is a H − 1-dimensional manifold, and
(b) if Pu−1(0) is compact, then for any u ∈ Vu(Pu−1(0)), the set {a ∈ Pu−1(0)∣∣ Vu(a) =
u} is finite and its cardinality is locally constant as a function of u. If the cardinality
of this set is one for all u ∈ Vu(Pu−1(0)), then Vu is a diffeomorphism between
Pu−1(0) and Vu(Pu−1(0)) and the solution mappings (optimal values of the choice
variables) of problem (3.1) are smooth functions.36
Proof: Let Vu(Pu−1(0)) =: V u.We need to show that V u is aH−1-dimensional manifold.
Pick u ∈ V u. There exists a ∈ Pu−1(0) such that u = Vu(a). The structure of the Jacobian
∇V implies that Vu : Pu−1(0) → RH is an immersion at every point in its domain.
Therefore, there exist (i) sets O and W open relative to Pu−1(0) and RH , respectively,
with a ∈ O and u ∈ W (ii) sets S1 and V1 open in RH−1 and RH , respectively, and (iii)
diffeomorphisms φ1 : O → S1 and φ2 : W → V1 such that φ2 ◦ Vu ◦ φ1−1 : S1 → V1 is
the standard immersion i : S1 → V1. This implies that i(S1) ⊂ V1 is a H − 1-dimensional
35 If preferences of consumers are monotonic and v ∈ Pu−1(0), then v ∈ ΩˆE .
36 Note, we can argue that the dimension of the utility possibility frontier being H − 1 is a phenomenon
that is generically true.
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manifold and hence φ2
−1
(i(S1)) = Vu(O) ⊂ W is a H − 1-dimensional manifold.37 We
show that Vu(O) is open relative to V u. Suppose not. This means that there exists no
set Wˆ open relative RH such that Wˆ ∩ V u = Vu(O). Pick a set W¯ open relative to
RH such that the image of Proj1 : (W¯ ∩ V u) → RH−1 is the same as the image of
Proj2 : Vu(O)→ RH−1, where Proj1 and Proj2 are the projection operators, where the
projections are taken into the space formed by coordinates u2, . . . , uH .
38 Since, Vu(O) is
not open relative to V u by our supposition, there exists a point u = (u1, . . . , u2) ∈ W¯ ∩V u
such that u /∈ Vu(O). But Proj1(u) ∈ Proj2(Vu(O)). This means there exists uˆ ∈ Vu(O)
such that uˆh = u¯h for all h = 2, . . . , H but uˆ1 6= u¯1. This means that the value function
of the problem (3.1), Uu takes two different values for parameters (u2, . . . , uH). This is
not possible. Hence we have a contradiction. Therefore Vu(O) is open relative to V u.
Thus, we found an open neighborhood around u in V u that is diffeomorphic to an open
set in RH−1. Since u was arbitrarily chosen, this is true for all u ∈ V u. Hence, V u is a
H − 1-dimensional manifold.
Since, Vu : Pu−1(0) → RH , is an immersion, for all a ∈ Pu−1(0), we have ∇Vu :
TPu−1(0)a → TV uu is an isomorphism, where TPu−1(0)a and TV uu are the tangent spaces
of Pu−1(0) and V u, respectively, at a and Vu(a) = u, respectively. Hence, every u in V u
is a regular value. The cardinality conclusion in (b) about the set {a ∈ Pu−1(0)∣∣ Vu(a) =
u} follows from arguments in Milnor [1931; pp. 8]. This, along with conclusion (a) of
this lemma, implies the conclusion that Vu is a diffeomorphism between Pu−1(0) and
Vu(Pu−1(0)) if the cardinality of that set is one for all u ∈ V u. Pu−1(0) is the set of all
possible solution vectors of problem (3.1) for all parameter values (u2, . . . , uH) for which
solution exists. Suppose Vu is diffeomorphic and v 6= v′ are such that they both solve
(3.1) for some (u2, . . . uH). Then Vu(v) = Vu(v′) contradicting the bijectiveness of Vu.
Hence, the solution mappings (optimal values of the choice variables) of problem (3.1)
are functions. Since Vu : Pu−1(0) → Vu(Pu−1(0)), is a diffeomorphism, its inverse exists
and is smooth. Hence, the solution mappings (optimal values of the choice variables) of
problem (3.1) are smooth functions of the parameters of the problem (3.1).
The allocation corresponding to any v ∈ Pu−1(0) is obtained by the mapping A(v)
by using consumer demand and producer supply functions. Denote the image of this map-
ping by A(〈θh〉) := A(Pu−1(0)). A(〈θh〉) is the set of allocations (〈xh0 , xh〉, y0, ym, yc, yg)
underlying the solutions to (3.1).
Define the mapping ρu : A(〈θh〉)→ ρu(A(〈θh〉)) with image
(u1(x
1
0, x
1), u2(x
2
0, x
2), . . . , u2(x
H
0 , x
H)) (7.28)
37 Note, locally, Vu is diffeomorphic, that is Vu : O → Vu(O) is a diffeomorphism. This is because,
Vu−1 : Vu(O)→ O is defined by φ−11 ◦ i−1 ◦ φ2, which exists and is smooth.
38 W¯ exists. For every a ∈ Vu(O), there exists a > 0 such that Na(a)∩Vu(O) is diffeomorphic to some
open set Va ofRH−1. Here Na(a) is the usual open ball around a inR
H . Choose an open (relative toRH)
rectangle Ra ⊂ Na(a) such that a ∈ Ra and Proj1(Ra) = Proj2(Ra ∩ Vu(O)). Then W¯ = ∪a∈Vu(O)Ra.
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for every (〈xh0 , xh〉, y0, ym, yc, yg) ∈ A(〈θh〉). ρu gives the utility imputations associated
with allocations in A(〈θh〉). Clearly, for every a ∈ A(〈θh〉), there exists v ∈ Pu−1(0) such
that a = A(v), so that ρu(a) = Vu(v).
Lemma A6: Suppose Assumptions 1 to 6 hold and Vu : Pu−1(0) → Vu(Pu−1(0)) is a
diffeomorphism. Then the mapping
ρu : A(〈θh〉)→ ρu(A(〈θh〉)) (7.29)
is bijective.
Proof: If Vu is diffeomorphic then the allocation mapping A is one-to-one, under the
maintained assumptions. So if a, a′ ∈ A(〈θh〉) such that a 6= a′, then v = A−1(a) 6=
A−1(a′) = v′ (note v and v′ are unique under the maintained assumptions). This implies
that ρ(a) = Vu(v) 6= Vu(v′) = ρ(a′).
The unit envelope of all possible private ownership economies with unit taxes is
obtained by programme (3.2) as the set
Uˆu := {〈uh〉 ∈ RH
∣∣ ∃(u2 . . . , uH) ∈ RH−1 such that u1 = Uˆu(u2, . . . , uH)}. (7.30)
The solution of the problem (3.2) is given by (3.3).
Lemma A7: Suppose assumptions of Lemma A5 hold. Then Uˆu is a manifold of di-
mension H − 1.
Proof: Let ∗u ∈ Uˆu. Then there exists 〈∗θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1 such that ∗u1 = Uu(∗u2, . . . , ∗uH , 〈
∗
θh〉).
We need to find a neighborhood around ∗u open relative to Uˆu which is diffeomorphic to an
open set in RH−1. Under our maintained assumptions, it follows from Lemma A5, that
the set
Uu(〈∗θh〉) := {〈uh〉 ∈ RH
∣∣ ∃(u2 . . . , uH) ∈ RH−1 such that u1 = Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈∗θh〉)}
(7.31)
is a manifold of dimension H − 1. Hence there exists a set U open in RH with ∗u ∈ U
such that W := U ∩ Uu(〈∗θh〉) is diffeomorphic to some open set in RH−1. We prove
that the mapping Proj : W → Proj(W ) with image Proj(u) = (u2, . . . , uH) for every
u ∈ W is such a diffeomorphism. The mapping Proj : W → RH−1is a standard sub-
mersion and hence an open mapping (maps open subsets of W into open sets in RH−1).
Further, this is an injective mapping. ( For suppose not. Then, there exist u and u¯
in W with u 6= u¯ such that Proj(u) = Proj(u¯) =: (u2, . . . , uH), say. This contra-
dicts the fact that u1 = Uu(u2, . . . , uH , 〈∗θh〉) is unique for parameter values (u2, . . . , uH).)
Hence, Proj : W → Proj(W ) is a diffeomorphism and Proj(W ) is a H − 1-dimensional
manifold. Let the inverse mapping of Proj : W → Proj(W ) be denoted by g. Then
g(∗u2, . . . , ∗uH) = (Uu(∗u2, . . . , ∗uH , 〈∗θh〉), ∗u2, . . . , ∗uH) = ∗u. Define a mapping f : Proj(W )→
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RH by f(u2, . . . , uH) = (Uˆu(u2, . . . , uH), u2, . . . , uH). f is a well defined mapping as g
is well defined in Proj(W ), so that for every (u2, . . . , uH) ∈ Proj(W ), the constraint set
of problem (3.2) is not empty. In particular, f(∗u2, . . . , ∗uH) = g(∗u2, . . . , ∗uH) = ∗u. By an
application of the envelope theorem ∇g∗u = ∇f∗u. By its definition, ∇g∗u : RH−1 → RH
is an immersion. Therefore ∇f∗u : RH−1 → RH is also an immersion. Hence, following
steps similar to the last part of proof of part (a) of Lemma A5, we can show (i) that there
exists a neighborhood U around (∗u2, . . . , ∗uH) in Proj(W ) such that f(U) is a manifold of
dimension H − 1 and (ii) that f(U) is open relative to both f(Proj(W )) and Uˆu. Thus,
we have found a neighborhood open relative to Uˆu around ∗u that is diffeomorphic to an
open set in RH−1. This is true for any ∗u ∈ Uˆu. Hence, the conclusion of the theorem
follows.
Lemma A8: Suppose assumptions of Lemma A5 hold and Vu : Pu−1(0)→ Vu(Pu−1(0))
is a diffeomorphism for all 〈θh〉 ∈ ∆H−1 economies and the solution mapping (3.3) of the
problem (3.2) is a function.39 Then the mapping
ρu : A→ ρu(A) (7.32)
is bijective.
Proof: Proof follows from the fact that, since the solution mapping of the problem (3.2)
is a function, every u ∈ ρu(A) corresponds to a tangency between the unit envelope and a
Pareto frontier of a unique 〈θh〉 economy. Under the maintained assumptions, Lemma A6
implies the uniqueness of the allocation underlying u.
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